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Taxing Audit Markets and Reputation: 
An Examination of the U.S. Tax Shelter Controversy 
 
Abstract 
 
From 2002 to 2007, the nation’s largest CPA firms faced allegations of illegal activity 
related to the sale of tax shelters: EY, KPMG and PwC paid fines; KPMG was investigated by a 
federal grand jury; and EY faced a criminal inquiry. These shelter events occurred shortly after 
the 2002 collapse of Arthur Andersen, when policy makers were concerned about audit market 
concentration. This is the first paper to provide a chronological summary of how the tax shelter 
controversy started and ended. We investigate the stock market reaction to tax shelter news 
developments between 2003 and 2005 to make inferences about the market’s view of audit 
competition and CPA firm reputation. Our results are consistent with market concern over large 
audit firm concentration, evidenced by large negative returns for clients of all audit providers 
upon the KPMG grand jury investigation announcement. We also find that tax shelter activities 
impact both the reputation of the accounting profession and the individual CPA firms marketing 
tax shelter products. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  
Aggressive tax shelters, Insurance hypothesis, Auditor reputation, Audit quality 
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Taxing Audit Markets and Reputation: 
An Examination of the U.S. Tax Shelter Controversy 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In November 2003, Congress held hearings on allegedly abusive and/or illegal tax 
shelters sold by Ernst & Young, LLP (EY), KPMG, LLP (KPMG) and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
LLP (PwC). The accounting profession, as well as these named firms, faced a loss of reputation 
from information disclosed at these hearings.1  KPMG and EY also faced possible criminal 
indictments or convictions resulting from Department of Treasury and Justice Department (DOJ) 
investigations, which ultimately could have led to the demise of these firms.  
We examine market concerns about the concentration of audit providers. Companies with 
global operations require an international audit firm for auditor efficiency, reputation, and 
industry expertise, limiting their choice of auditor. If the reputation of one of the large 
international audit firms is tarnished such that the firm is either unable to or precluded from 
providing audit services, publicly-listed global firms on both U.S. and foreign stock markets 
could be significantly impacted. Therefore, our research should be of interest to academics and 
practitioners in international jurisdictions.   
We use event study methodology to examine whether the market reacted negatively to 
news large auditors faced criminal investigations during the public announcement of key tax 
shelter events from 2003 to 2005. Because these investigations could have led to the demise of 
another large CPA firm, we use market reactions to specific tax shelter public investigation 
announcements and related public disclosures to make inferences about the potential impact of 
                                                 
1 We investigate publicly available information, including Congressional hearing documents and reports in the 
financial press.  There could have been investigations of other CPA firms which were not made public.  The hearing 
included shelters sold by groups other than CPAs.  Our discussion is limited to CPA firms.  
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concentration in the audit market. We find evidence suggesting the market was concerned with 
large audit firm market concentration from 2003 to 2005.  
We also examine whether sale of tax shelters had a reputational spillover effect, both to 
the involved audit firms and to the profession as a whole. We address this question by examining 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of audit clients when information was revealed during and 
following congressional hearings. For audit firms marketing these tax shelters, two competing 
hypotheses could explain negative abnormal returns. First, the reputation of the audit firm may 
be impaired, reducing perceived quality of the audit (DeAngelo, 1981). Second, to the extent 
firm survival was threatened, the stock market may discount client stock prices because of 
concerns the CPA firm will no longer be available as a form of insurance (Menon and Williams, 
1994). To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine a profession-wide spillover effect 
when members of the audit profession have been accused of wrongdoing.  
To draw conclusions about audit competition, we measure CARs surrounding February 
20, 2004, the KPMG Federal Grand Jury investigation announcement date, and May 25, 2004, 
the date EY announced it was the subject of a criminal inquiry. We examine six groups of audit 
clients: audit clients of each Big 4 firm, Midsize firms, and Small firms. Audit clients of all 
groups have significant negative CARs on the KPMG announcement date. We conclude that the 
market was concerned with potential diminishing competition among large audit providers. On 
the EY announcement date, CARs are significantly negative for clients of Midsize and Small 
firms. Audit clients of both KPMG and EY have significantly negative CARs on their respective 
investigation announcement dates; these negative returns may also be attributed to reputation 
loss and audit quality concerns. 
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To address reputational spillover, we examine CARs surrounding November 18, 2003, 
the first day of Congressional hearings. Testimony on this date includes information about tax 
shelters sold by EY, KPMG, and PwC. Returns for all client groups are negative and significant. 
Our interpretation, in part, is that there is reputation damage to the profession as a whole because 
the negative market reactions are not limited to the clients of tax shelter providers singled out in 
the testimony. For audit clients of firms testifying at the hearings, there are other potential 
interpretations of the negative returns. The hearings allege compromised independence as a 
result of these tax shelters being sold to audit clients. To the extent the hearings were a precursor 
to criminal investigations, the market may have anticipated the future demise of one or more of 
these CPA firms. 
We evaluate two other important dates, January 12, 2004 and August 29, 2005, for the 
market reaction of KPMG audit clients. On January 12, 2004, the KPMG announcement of tax 
practice personnel changes, we observe positive CARs. This reaction is consistent with a 
reputation explanation, as the firm appeared to be taking steps to address problems identified in 
the hearings. On August 29, 2005, when KPMG admitted to criminal wrongdoing and announced 
a deferred settlement agreement with the DOJ, we observe negative CARs. These results are 
consistent with KPMG’s reputation being damaged by entering into such an agreement. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the hearings and the history of tax shelters and tax shelter abuses. Section 3 
reviews the literature and develops research questions and methodology. Section 4 describes the 
sample, descriptive statistics, and CAR estimation method. Section 5 summarizes results, Section 
6 provides additional analyses, and Section 7 presents our conclusions. 
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2. Background 
2.1. The Congressional Hearings 
Table 1 describes the event dates in the tax shelter timeline. On October 2, 2002, the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
began an investigation into development, marketing, and implementation of tax shelters by 
accountants, lawyers, financial advisors, and bankers.2 On November 18
 
and 20, 2003, the 
Subcommittee held hearings3 in which three of the Big 4 firms testified.4 The hearings 
underscored the extent of accounting firm involvement in marketing tax shelter products. 
Testimony and final report primarily focused on the activities of KPMG;5 however, EY and PwC 
also testified at the hearings. 
2.2. A history of tax shelters and tax shelter abuses 
Tax shelter registration requirements under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6111, 
define a “tax shelter" as any entity, plan, arrangement, or transaction, a significant purpose of 
which is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax, which a firm offers under conditions of 
confidentiality, and for which tax shelter promoters may receive fees in excess of $100,000. IRC 
Section 6112 requires organizers and sellers of tax shelters to keep lists of investors and to make 
such lists available for inspection. 
CPA firms began promoting tax shelters in the early 1990s, when contingent fee rules 
changed. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) revised the Code of 
                                                 
2 U.S. Senate, 2003, p. 1.   
3 The hearings were held on November 18 and 20, 2003, with CPA firms testifying on the first day. The November 
18 testimony can be viewed at:  http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/u-s-tax-shelter-
industry-the-role-of-accountants-lawyers-and-financial-professionals-day-1 
The transcript can be found at (Item 4 on that page):  
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/search/?q=abusive%20tax%20shelters&start=15&as_sitesearch=&page=2 
4 Also testifying at the Congressional hearings are various financial institutions, lawyers, investment advisors, and 
charitable organizations. 
5 Six partners from KPMG testified on November 18, while only one partner each from EY and PwC testified.   
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Professional Conduct (Rule 302, Contingent Fees) on May 20, 1991, allowing accountants to 
engage in contingent fee billing for non-attest services. Substantial revenue potential appears to 
be the underlying reason accounting firms chose to provide tax shelter services to their clients. 
2.3. KPMG’s involvement with tax shelters 
Testimony at the hearings indicated KPMG began aggressively creating and selling tax 
shelter products in 1997. According to a 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, KPMG 
generated nearly $1.2 billion (approximately 37%) of its U.S. revenues from tax services during 
2002.6 An interview with an unnamed former member of KPMG’s Board of Directors states 
KPMG "…came to the party late. We drank more, and we stayed longer."7  
The Subcommittee investigation also addressed concerns about KPMG’s independence 
with respect to its audit clients. KPMG circumvented the contingent fee rules by developing 
“fixed fees” that were, in substance, contingent fees.8 Within KPMG, the head of the Department 
of Professional Practice – Tax (DPPT) took the position that fees based on projected client tax 
savings were contingent fees prohibited by AICPA Rule 302.9 The Congressional hearings noted 
a KPMG memorandum strongly objecting to the DPPT interpretation of Rule 302 because 
“many, if not most, of our Capital Transaction Services Group targets are 
officers/directors/shareholders of our assurance clients”.10  
                                                 
6 GAO (2003a) Table 2, page 17. 
7 Quote taken from CorpWatch, Holding Corporations Accountable, “US: How an Accounting Firm went from 
Resistance to Resignation” by Lynnley Browning, The New York Times, August 2005. 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12575 (accessed September 29, 2006). 
8 In order to circumvent the “contingent fees” restriction, the fees charged by KPMG for BLIPS were called a “fixed 
fee”, set at 7% of the generated “tax loss” clients would achieve on paper. KPMG developed “basis points” (portions 
of the 7% fee) which depended upon the size of the client’s expected tax loss to determine their amount. The 
Subcommittee concluded in the case studies examined the fees charged by KPMG for their tax shelter products were 
clearly based upon the clients’ projected tax savings (Part VI, Section B (5), page 113, paragraph 3 of the Permanent 
Subcommittee Report). 
9 Part VI, Section B(5), page 110, paragraph 3 of the Permanent Subcommittee Report, interview of Lawrence 
DeLap (10/30/03); memorandum dated 7/14/98, from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, “Rule 302 
and Contingency Fees – CONFIDENTIAL,” Bates  KPMG 0026557-58. 
10 Part VI, Section B (5), page 111, paragraph 1 of the Permanent Subcommittee Report.  
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The Subcommittee described KPMG’s steps to conceal its tax shelter activities, including 
its failure to abide by the disclosure requirements of IRC Sections 6111 and 6112. KPMG took 
the position that it did not develop, sell, or promote tax shelters, and, therefore, did not register 
and disclose any of its tax products. In addition, KPMG refused to comply with IRS document 
requests for lists of clients who purchased tax shelters.  
During Subcommittee testimony, the head of KPMG’s Tax Practice admitted “certain tax 
strategies previously offered by the firm, and the manner in which they were offered, were 
inconsistent with the role expected of a professional organization to which public trust and 
confidence are indispensable” (U.S. Senate, 2003). The Subcommittee concluded “although 
KPMG denies being a tax shelter promoter, the evidence established KPMG has devoted 
substantial resources to, and obtained significant fees from, developing, marketing, and 
implementing potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters …, costing the U.S. Treasury billions of 
dollars in lost tax revenues” (U.S. Senate, 2003). 
Although KPMG committed to structural, cultural, and institutional changes and agreed 
to dismantle its abusive tax shelter practice at the hearings, the firm did not issue any press 
release until January 12, 2004. The announcement indicated Jeffrey Stein, Deputy Chair of 
KPMG and former Vice Chair of Tax Services, would retire at the end of January 2004; Richard 
Smith, Jr. (then the head of Tax Service Practice) would be removed from office and assigned 
other duties; and Jeff Eischeid, the partner in charge of KPMG’s Personal Financial Planning 
Practice, was placed on administrative leave (Accountingweb.com, 2004). 
On February 20, 2004, The New York Times revealed that the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York was conducting a federal grand jury investigation of KPMG for 
alleged participation in the sale of tax shelters (Johnson, 2004a). In May 2005, the U.S. Attorney 
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notified KPMG of its imminent indictment. On June 5, 2005, Eugene O’Kelly, KPMG 
Chairman, stepped down due to a brain tumor. Timothy Flynn, a KPMG management committee 
member, was appointed Chairman. That same month, numerous articles expressed concern 
KPMG might not survive the tax shelter fallout. The Wall Street Journal noted on June 16, 2005: 
“Federal prosecutors have built a criminal case against KPMG for obstruction of justice and the 
sale of abusive tax shelters, igniting a debate among top DOJ officials over whether to seek an 
indictment – at the risk of killing one of the four remaining big accounting firms” (Wilke, 2005). 
Days later, The Wall Street Journal reported the SEC was discussing a contingency plan if 
another large CPA firm failed (Solomon and Gullapalli, 2005). 
Concerns over the possible demise of KPMG may have been mitigated by the Supreme 
Court’s reversal of the Arthur Andersen conviction on May 31, 2005. Editorials in The Wall 
Street Journal and The Washington Post in mid-June 2005 made it clear a death sentence for 
KPMG was not viewed as prudent, given the court’s decision (Anonymous, 2005a, 2005b). 
These editorials noted a need for more, not fewer, CPA firms and found no justice in putting the 
employees of KPMG out of work. 
On June 13, 2005, Timothy Flynn met with DOJ officials and admitted to “selling 
shelters to help people avoid taxes” (Reilly, 2007). On June 16, 2005, KPMG issued a press 
release “taking full responsibility for ‘unlawful conduct by former KPMG partners’ in offering 
tax services” (KPMG LLP, 2005). The release stated the firm had “instituted firm-wide 
structural, cultural, and governance reforms to ensure the highest ethical standards,” including 
“significant change in its business practices,” would “remain in discussions with the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and continue to cooperate fully in its investigation,” and looked “forward to a 
resolution that recognizes the significant reforms the firm has already made in response to this 
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matter, while appropriately sanctioning the firm for this wrongdoing” (KPMG LLP, 2005). 
Shortly thereafter, the DOJ announced it was considering a settlement. 
On August 29, 2005, KPMG issued a press release announcing a settlement with the DOJ 
and the IRS. As part of the agreement, KPMG agreed to three payments to the U.S. government 
totaling $456 million to avoid further legal action. Under the deferred prosecution agreement, 
charges against KPMG would be dismissed on December 31, 2006, if the firm complied with the 
terms of the agreement. The DOJ announcement stated: “KPMG LLP has admitted to criminal 
wrongdoing…and … admitted that it engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion 
dollars in phony tax losses” (United States Department of Justice, 2005). On February 15, 2007, 
The Wall Street Journal reported “KPMG now is emerging from what some at the firm call a 
near-death experience” (Reilly, 2007). The deferred criminal charges were ultimately dismissed 
because of satisfactory reforms made by the firm in its tax practice as required under the 
settlement agreement. 
2.4. EY’s involvement in tax shelters 
On July 2, 2003, EY issued a press release concurrently admitting to the sale of shelters 
to clients between 1998 and 2002 and announced a settlement with the DOJ and the IRS. Under 
this settlement, EY paid a $15 million civil penalty, turned over a list of clients who purchased 
the tax shelters, and pledged to institute systematic reforms within its tax practice (Cassell and 
McKinnon, 2003). IRS Commissioner Mark Everson stated, “This represents a real breakthrough 
and is a good working model for agreements with practitioners. … [W]e are trying to 
differentiate between those who cooperate with the IRS, who try to remedy past mistakes and 
who seek transparency in their dealings with the Service, and those others who simply refuse and 
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continue to peddle abusive transactions. Our intention is to differ in our approach to them based 
on their behavior.” 
Despite the July 2003 settlement, on May 25, 2004, EY announced it was under criminal 
investigation regarding the tax shelter implicated in its $15 million civil fine (Johnson, 2004b). 
On May 31, 2007, the financial press reported EY would likely not face indictment (Reilly and 
Davies, 2007; Davies and Bray, 2007). On March 1, 2013, EY announced a settlement with the 
U.S. Attorney’s office and $123 million in fines and penalties, admitting it used fraudulent tax 
shelters to help its clients avoid or defer taxes during the 1998 to 2006 period.11 
2.5. PwC’s involvement in tax shelters 
On June 26, 2002, PwC announced a settlement with the DOJ and the IRS related to 
shelter products.12 PwC agreed to pay a $10 million penalty, turn over a list of tax shelter clients 
to the IRS, and make comprehensive changes to the firm’s internal quality control procedures. 
PwC testified at the Congressional hearings that they had disbanded the group selling abusive 
shelters late in 1999 (United States Senate 2003, pp 99-100). 
2.6. Other CPA firms and tax shelters 
Other CPA firms were not mentioned in the Congressional hearings. However, BDO 
Seidman, LLP (Seidman) involvement in tax shelter-related activities was in the news during the 
2002-2004 time period. Seidman is part of our Midsize firm group. The impact of Seidman’s 
involvement in tax shelters on the Midsize group is discussed in Section 6 of this paper. 
Insert Table 1 here 
                                                 
11 Available at:  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324662404578334591048912854.html 
12 Price Waterhouse and I.R.S. Settle Tax Shelter Dispute. The New York Times. June 28, 2002, Late Edition, Final 
Section C, Column 4, page 2. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/business/pricewaterhouse-and-irs-settle-tax-
shelter-dispute.html  In this article, the IRS described the penalty paid by PwC as ‘substantial’, whereas the PwC 
spokesman, David Nestor, described the penalty as ‘insignificant’ – the amount of the penalty paid by PwC was not 
disclosed in this newspaper article. 
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3.  Literature review, research questions and research method  
3.1. Literature review 
Our study is based on two streams of research: auditor quality and auditors as a form of 
insurance. The need to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and stockholders 
motivates the demand for a high quality audit. DeAngelo (1981) notes it is costly and almost 
impossible for stockholders to observe audit quality directly; therefore, stockholders rely on 
audit quality surrogates. DeAngelo (1981) also asserts larger audit firms have stronger incentives 
to provide high quality audits due to the amount of quasi-rents they are likely to lose if their 
reputation is diminished. Prior literature documents a negative impact on client firms’ stock 
prices when auditor reputation is tarnished.  
Auditor reputation is a common surrogate for audit quality in academic research (Watkins 
et al., 2004). Audit quality has been examined empirically in terms of the market impact on audit 
clients (Baber et al., 1995; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Weber et al., 
2008; Dee et al., 2011), as well as audit clients’ stock price reaction to deterioration of their 
auditor’s reputation (Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Hillison and 
Pacini, 2004; Barton, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2008). Specifically, 
Chaney and Philipich (2002) find Arthur Andersen’s clients experienced negative abnormal 
returns persisting for up to two days following the announcement of document shredding, 
concluding “….investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen” (Chaney 
and Philipich, p.1244). Furthermore, Lennox (1999) documents a favorable stock market 
reaction when companies switch to a large auditor.  
The insurance hypothesis is based on the premise that auditors are valued by the market 
both as assurance service providers and as providers of insurance to indemnify investors against 
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losses in the event of an alleged audit failure. This hypothesis has been empirically tested using 
cases of audit firm bankruptcy (Menon and Williams, 1994; Baber et al., 1995), as well as 
surrounding rumors of potential audit firm bankruptcy (Pacini and Hillison, 2003; Hillison and 
Pacini, 2004).  
Both reputation and insurance explanations can account for negative price reaction to 
audit clients when their auditor is perceived as providing a substandard audit (Baber et al., 1995; 
Hillison and Pacini, 2004; Dee et al., 2011). Dee et al. (2011) find a negative market reaction to 
DT clients following the news of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
sanctions. This reaction is significantly more negative for financially-distressed firms. In an 
attempt to distinguish between the two explanations, Willenborg (1999) finds evidence 
suggesting the insurance-based demand for IPO audits helps explain the relationship between 
auditor choice and underpricing13. Finally, Lennox (1999) finds large audit firms do not suffer a 
reduction in demand for their services when facing reputation-damaging criticisms, noting the 
insurance hypothesis can explain the lack of evidence for reputation effects. 
Negative market reaction to clients of scrutinized auditors is not limited to U.S. firms. 
Skinner and Srinivasan (2012), in connection with PwC’s Japanese affiliate’s (ChuoAoyama) 
failed audit of a large Japanese cosmetics company, analyze the importance of auditors’ 
reputation for quality in a country where litigation does not play a critical role. They find a large 
number of ChuoAoyama’s clients defected, consistent with the auditor reputation hypothesis. 
They also find a significant negative stock price reaction on the date PwC announced they were 
sending auditors from the U.S. and the U.K. to address ChuoAoyama’s problems. Weber et al. 
(2008) study the market impact on KPMG’s German clients surrounding the highly-publicized 
                                                 
13 Willenborg (1999) partitioned his sample of firms into start-up companies (IPOs) and established companies, 
based on the notion for development stage firms, the quality of the audit should not matter and, therefore, the 
insurance demand for auditing is likely to dominate the information-based demand. 
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accounting scandal at ComROAD AG, and find negative abnormal returns of 3%. Weber et al. 
(2008) find an increase in the number of audit clients dropping KPMG as their auditors in the 
year of the ComROAD scandal, providing further support for auditor reputation as a surrogate 
for audit quality. Weber et al. (2008) also find, in the German legal environment which limits 
damages from suing the auditor, a negative stock price reaction for KPMG clients surrounding 
the public disclosure of the ComROAD AG accounting scandal. They conclude this negative 
reaction is due to tarnished auditor reputation rather than the insurance hypothesis.14  
3.2. Research question 1: Audit market concentration 
  Our first research question examines market concern about audit market concentration, as 
some of the large firms faced criminal investigations of tax shelter activities. Competing views 
remain as to whether allowing the collapse of another large firm is good for the market. First, 
with the shrinking number of large audit firms, companies may have difficulty finding a high 
quality auditor.15 Conversely, without the threat of failure, firms may not provide appropriate 
audit quality. William McDonough, former head of PCAOB, testified before the House Financial 
Services Committee, stating the “lack of apparent competition” in accounting is a difficult public 
policy issue. He viewed it as a mistake to let a firm think it is too big to fail.16 
We examine audit concentration by investigating CARs for six groups (each of the Big 4 
firms, Midsize firms, and the Small firms) of audit clients on the dates when criminal 
                                                 
14 At the time of the ComROAD AG scandal, there was a limit of 4 million Euros for which an auditor could be held 
liable under Germany and European Community laws. 
15 The GAO (2003b) survey of CFO’s of Fortune 1000 firms regarding auditor choice following the Andersen 
collapse finds 88% of the CFO’s stated they would not consider a non-Big 4 auditor to replace their current Big 4 
auditor.  These CFO’s also raised concerns the further consolidation of CPA firms would result in too few auditor 
choices; 82% of the CFO’s believed four large auditors was at or below the minimum number required.  
Furthermore, because of the need to have an auditor capable of auditing a client with global operations, as a practical 
matter, their choice was often actually limited to only one or two auditors. 
16 House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, Hearing on Oversight of the Public Company Accounting Board, Thursday, June 24, 2004.  
Accessed at:  http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/archive/hearings318.shtml 
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investigations were announced for KPMG and EY. If the market was concerned about audit 
market concentration and these investigations were perceived as bad news, we would expect to 
see negative CARs on the announcement date for clients of all auditors.  
We also expect CARs of clients of CPA firms under investigation to be negative. There 
are three potentially competing explanations for these negative CARs. First, investors in clients 
of investigated firms may be concerned about high audit market concentration. Second, the 
firm’s reputation could be negatively impacted by the criminal investigation. Finally, if the 
criminal investigation signals the potential demise of a CPA firm, market reaction could be 
attributed to the insurance hypothesis.   
3.3. Research question 2: Reputational spillover 
 
Our second research question examines whether sale of tax shelters had a reputational 
spillover effect. We address this question from two perspectives. First, we evaluate whether the 
reputation of the profession may have been damaged from tax shelter events by examining CARs 
of audit clients of the Big 4, Midsize, and Small CPA firms on the first day of the Congressional 
hearings. Although the hearings brought out facts about specific firms and individuals, there 
could be spillover to the reputation of CPAs in general. If reputational damage was profession-
wide, we would expect negative CARs for all clients.17  
Second, we examine whether the reputation of the investigated CPA firms may have been 
damaged, by assessing CARs for audit clients of KPMG and EY when criminal investigations 
were announced and, for KPMG, when the charges were resolved (the EY criminal investigation 
was not resolved until March 2013). There are differing interpretations of negative CARs for the 
                                                 
17 We attempt to measure whether the magnitude of the CARs for the firms was related to shelters sold to audit 
clients.  The GAO (2005) report indicates a number of clients purchased shelter products from their auditor, but a 
list of which clients did this was unavailable. We tried to obtain lists of companies and individuals who subsequently 
sued the CPA firms to recover losses related to the shelters but were unable to do so.  
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named firms. Quality control or independence concerns may have damaged the firm’s reputation. 
In addition, any indication the firm may face criminal investigation could have implications 
under the insurance hypothesis. 
The question of reputational spillover, especially when a CPA firm’s non-audit practice 
potentially affects the firm’s audit practice or the reputation of all CPAs, is important. 
Understanding this spillover effect provides insight into firm and profession policies and 
practices, including disciplinary actions of professionals, inspections, and quality control issues. 
If the actions of a few individuals hurt the entire profession, then more severe disciplinary 
actions may be needed. Further, if non-audit services damage the reputation of a firm or the 
profession, this may impact a firm’s internal quality controls and PCAOB inspection standards. 
In a study of whether the results of peer reviews signal audit quality, Casterella et al. (2009) find 
the factor score incorporating tax shelter activities is positive and significantly associated with 
the total number of weaknesses identified in auditors’ self-disclosed peer-review reports, 
suggesting lower quality audits. 
4.  Identification of observations, descriptive statistics, and CARs estimation method 
 
4.1. Data collection and descriptive statistics 
 
For each event date, we obtain all auditor-client information from Audit Analytics. We 
eliminate firms without the necessary data on both CRSP and Compustat and those announcing 
an auditor switch between the effective date of the Audit Analytics information and the event 
date. See Table 2, Panel A. We divide the remaining observations into six groups: clients of each 
of the Big 4, Midsize firm clients, and all others (Small). Midsize firms, based on the Audit 
Analytics auditor size rankings classifications, include Grant Thornton, LLP; BDO Seidman, 
LLP; Crowe Chizak, LLP; McGladrey and Pullen, LLP; and Plante and Moran, LLP. Table 2, 
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Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the November 18, 2003 observations. Panel B shows the 
clear domination of Big 4 firms, in terms of number of clients and client size, with Big 4 clients 
comprising about 83% of the observations, Midsize clients 7%, and Small clients 10%. 
Insert Table 2 here 
4.2. Calculation of mean cumulative abnormal returns 
We obtain mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using Eventus and a window of (-
1, +1) around each event date.18 CARs are calculated using the size index, own market19 option 
in Eventus, which matches each stock to a market and size decile using the CRSP reported 
exchange and decile number as of the event date. Non-trading dates are converted to the next 
trading date. The estimation period is 255 days, ending 46 days before the event date, to 
minimize contamination of the event window. The minimum required number of returns for the 
calculation of CARs is three. 
5.  Results 
5.1. Audit market concentration 
Results for the February 20, 2004, KPMG’s Grand Jury investigation announcement are 
shown in Table 3, Panel A. Mean and median CARs for all Big 4 firms and the Midsize group 
are negative and significant at the 0.001 level. The Small group’s mean and median CARs are 
significant at the 0.001 and 0.05 levels, respectively. These results strongly suggest the market 
was concerned about potential loss of a large audit firm. Mean CARs for the Big 4 firms range 
                                                 
18 MacKinlay (1997) notes it is difficult to make generalizable conclusions when detecting a non-zero abnormal 
return due to adequacy concerns of the event study methodology.  To address this limitation, MacKinlay (1997) 
suggests, among other means, shortening the event window, as we have done in our study.  In addition to the (-1, 
+1) CAR window reported in our analyses, we also obtain CARs for alternative windows [(-2, +2) and (-3, +3)] 
around each event date, and do not find significant differences in the results shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.   
19 The size index, own market option helps ensure ‘abnormal’ returns are based upon firms with similar 
characteristics while controlling simultaneously for economic effects shared by these firms. 
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from -0.71% for DT clients to -1.60% for EY clients.20 Mean CARs for the Midsize and Small 
providers are lower at -1.82% and -1.73%, respectively. The low CARs for these groups suggest 
that if another large CPA firm failed, audit quality, for smaller firm clients, in particular, could 
be compromised. This explanation is plausible, given large CPA firms were giving up both small 
and high-risk audit clients during this period (2003-2004), as the time demands of SOX Section 
404 implementation strained the large CPA firms’ resources (Landsman et al. 2009). The loss of 
another large audit provider could further strain the ability of Small firm clients to find high 
quality auditors. 
Significant negative CARs for KPMG clients (-1.07%) have an alternative explanation 
under the insurance hypothesis. Since the hearings focused on KPMG, negative returns for 
KPMG clients may reflect concerns KPMG might not survive to indemnify investors for losses 
awarded from settlements and lawsuits.  
CARs on May 25, 2004, the EY criminal inquiry announcement date, are shown in Table 
3, Panel B. For the Big 4 firms, mean CARs are negative (-0.06%) and significant (p-value=.001) 
only for EY. These findings are consistent with both the reputation and the insurance hypotheses. 
The EY announcement is not potentially as serious as the KPMG announcement, since EY was 
only facing an inquiry and not a grand jury investigation. Further, the market may not have 
viewed the EY inquiry as serious, since EY had previously announced a settlement with the IRS 
and paid a fine in the summer of 2003. Although EY testified in the Congressional hearing, its 
visibility was significantly less prominent than KPMG. Thus, the market may not have viewed 
                                                 
20 It is noteworthy the negative CARs for EY (-1.60%) are larger than the KPMG (-1.07%) on this date.  According 
to Cahan and Zhang (2006), out of the 368 firms switching from Andersen to the other Big 4 firms for their 2002 
audits, 113 (or 30%) switched to EY; 27% switched to KPMG; 26% switched to DT; and the remainder (17%) 
switched to PwC.  We speculate since a larger portion of Andersen’s audit clients switched to EY after the 
bankruptcy of Andersen perhaps these investors were more sensitive to the potential impact of the tax shelter issue 
on EY than KPMG on that particular date.  
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EY as being significantly at risk on the May 25, 2004 date.21 We do not find large negative 
CARs for other audit providers on this date. We speculate the market had already adjusted when 
the KPMG Federal Grand Jury announcement was made on February 20, 2004; also, KPMG was 
ordered to release tax shelter data under the IRS probe announced on May 4, 2004, a few weeks 
before the EY criminal investigation announcement. 
For Midsize and Small firms, we find significant negative mean CARs, -0.54% (p-
value=0.05) and -0.38% (p-value=0.05), respectively. This suggests residual concern about the 
continued existence of EY, as the failure of EY could cause realignments which might be most 
costly for the smallest audit firms. The significant mean and median tests for DT and PwC 
consistently suggest a positive market reaction to the stock price of these audit clients, 
potentially signaling the market looked favorably on the quality of the audits performed by DT 
and PwC on that date.    
Insert Table 3 here 
5.2. Reputational spillover 
Our second research question examines whether the sale of shelters had a reputational 
spillover effect on the audit practice and caused a corresponding negative market reaction to 
audit clients of the named firms. We examine the mean CARs of the six groups on the first day 
of the Congressional hearing, November 18, 2003. Results are shown in Table 4. 
Although the hearing only included information about shelters sold by EY, KPMG, and 
PwC, the mean abnormal returns for all groups are negative: significant at 0.10 for clients of EY 
and KPMG, 0.05 for DT, Midsize, and Small CPA clients, and 0.001 for PwC clients. Negative 
                                                 
21 We note the article published in the Late Edition of the Wall Street Journal on May 24, 2004 (‘Ernst & Young 
Faces Tax-Shelter Inquiry’ by Jonathan Weil) and subsequent press articles published by various news organizations 
on May 25, 2004 do not mention either DT or PwC – this possibly explains the positive and significant CARs shown 
in Table 3, Panel B for the audit clients of DT and PwC around the May 25, 2004 date. 
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mean (median) CARs for Big 4 clients range from -0.40% to -0.54% (-0.29 to -0.45%), and are 
approximately -1.00% (-0.45% to -0.60%) for the clients of Midsize and Small firms. The 
significant negative CARs for DT, Midsize, and Small firms suggest a reputation spillover to the 
profession on the first day of the hearings. 
For clients of firms testifying in the hearings, there are other potential interpretations of 
negative returns. The firms’ reputations were almost certainly damaged, as the hearings included 
allegations of compromised independence and aggressive marketing of shelters. To the extent the 
hearings were a precursor to criminal investigations, the market may have anticipated the demise 
of one or more CPA firms. This latter explanation, although plausible, is unlikely for PwC and 
EY, since both previously announced settlements with the IRS. 
Insert Table 4 here 
We evaluate additional event dates for KPMG after the hearings, the results of which are 
shown in Table 5. On January 12, 2004, the date KPMG announced tax department personnel 
changes, we observe significant positive mean and median CARs (p-value=0.05). This result 
indicates the announcement was likely viewed as a positive step towards rectifying problems in 
KPMG’s tax practice and rehabilitating the firm’s reputation. We find no market reaction on 
June 16, 2005, the date KPMG revealed it was in discussions with the DOJ, likely because the 
announcement did not contain either a positive or a negative indication of the status of those 
discussions. On August 29, 2005, KPMG admitted to criminal wrongdoing and announced a 
deferred settlement agreement with the DOJ. KPMG clients experienced -0.16% (-0.27%) mean 
(median) abnormal returns (significant at 0.01 (0.10)). The negative reaction suggests continued 
damage to the firm’s reputation. 
Insert Table 5 Here 
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6. Additional Analyses 
6.1. Alternative event dates 
We also examine CARs on May 31, 2005, the day the Supreme Court reversed the Arthur 
Andersen conviction. Results on this date, untabulated, are not significant.  
6.2 Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression model testing for event date clustering 
Given the common event-date, we also test for significance using the Schipper and 
Thompson (1983) regression model controls for cross-sectional dependence in residuals. Results 
for February 20, 2004 (Table 6, Panel A) show our variable of interest, Event, is negative and 
significant for all audit groups except DT. These findings are consistent with our significant 
negative mean and median CARs findings in Table 3, Panel A, and thus are robust to cross-
correlation dependence of residuals. Given that Event of DT clients is not significant, we need to 
be cautious in interpreting the CARs result for DT clients in Table 3, Panel A. 
For the EY criminal investigation date (Table 6, Panel B), Event is not significant for any 
audit-group. The findings in Table 6, Panel B suggest our Table 3, Panel B findings are not 
robust to residual dependence. Finally, in Table 6, Panel C, we find Event is negative and 
significant for both the Midsize and Small auditor-groups, consistent with Table 4. The lack of 
significant results for all other audit groups suggests our prior finding in Table 4 of significant 
negative mean CARs for DT, EY, KPMG, and PwC are not robust to cross-correlation among 
residuals.22  
Insert Table 6 here 
                                                 
22 An alternative explanation of our Tables 3-5 findings is the potential presence of confounding events or 
disclosures at the Company level during our event dates, such as earnings announcements; mergers; acquisitions; 
stock purchases; equity issuances; and bankruptcy filings.  Consistent with prior research (Thompson et al., 1987; 
Baber et al., 1995; Dee et al., 2011), we repeat our analyses in Tables 3-5, and find no evidence these potentially 
confounding events or disclosures influenced our mean CARs reported in any of our windows in Tables 3-5. 
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6.3. Multivariate analysis 
To further assess negative market reaction surrounding the Congressional hearings, we 
conduct a multivariate analysis by regressing CARs surrounding the first day of the hearings on 
proxies for auditor reputation and auditor insurance value.23 The dependent variable is the three-
day CARs of Big 4 audit clients testifying during the hearings; KPMG, EY and PwC. Our model 
is as follows:24 
CARs i,t = α0 + α1(Pr_Bankrupt i,t) + α2(LnAsset i,t) + α3(BM i,t) + α4(Leverage i,t) +  
α5(SaleGrowth i,t) + α6(ROA i,t) + α7(InstHold i,t-1) + α8(Switcher i,t) +  
α9(AASwitcher i) + α10(FeeRatio i,t)  +  е i,t                                                                         (1) 
, where25 
CARs = the firm specific cumulative abnormal returns in a three-day event window (-1, 
+1), where day 0 is the first hearing date (11/18/2003);  
Pr_Bankrupt = the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress measure26 for firm i at fiscal year-end t; 
LnAsset = the natural log of total assets (AT), in million dollars for firm i at fiscal year-end 
t; 
BM = the book value of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F) for firm i at fiscal year-end t; 
Leverage = the ratio of total debt (LT) to total assets (AT) for firm i at fiscal year-end t; 
SaleGrowth = the growth rate in sales calculated as the change in sales (SALE) from time t-1 
to time t, scaled by (SALE)t-1 of firm i at fiscal year-end t; 
ROA = the return on assets calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided 
by total assets (AT) for firm i at fiscal year-end t; 
InstHold = the percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders at the beginning of 
the fiscal year t; 
Switcher = 1 if firm i switches auditors in year t or t-1, and 0 otherwise, using 
(DISMISS_KEY); 
AASwitcher = 1 if firm i switched from Arthur Andersen in years 2000-2003, and 0 otherwise, 
using (DISMISS_KEY); and 
FeeRatio  = A proxy for auditor independence. We use the fee ratio measures as the 
                        ratio of non-audit fees (NON_AUDIT_FEES) to total fees 
                        (TOTAL_FEES) for firm i at fiscal year-end t.27 
                                                 
23 See Baber et al. (1995), Krishnamurthy et al. (2006), and Dee et al. (2011). 
24 We excluded the going concern opinion variable included in prior research because there were no firms in our 
sample receiving this type of audit opinion in the year prior to 2003 (2002 fiscal year). 
25 Each variable is obtained from Compustat except for bold variables (definitions), which are from Audit Analytics. 
26 The Zmijewski (1984) measure (Zscore) = -4.336 – 4.513*ROA + 5.679*FINL + 0.004*LIQ, where: 
ROA = Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), scaled by total assets (AT); 
FINL = Financial leverage equals total liabilities (LT) divided by total assets (AT); and 
LIQ = Liquidity is calculated as total current assets (ACT) divided by total current liabilities (LCT). 
23 
 
 
Table 7 includes descriptive statistics and regression results. The analysis is conducted 
for all clients combined and separately by firm. The KPMG and PwC analysis provides no 
evidence of either the insurance or reputation hypotheses. For EY, we find BM and ROA are 
significantly positive (p-value <0.01 and p-value <0.05, respectively). Prior research finds firms 
with low book-to-market ratios and low ROAs have greater incentives to manipulate accounting 
performance (Baber et al., 1995; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Dee et al., 2011). Our findings that 
EY clients with greater book-to-market ratio and greater ROA are associated with significantly 
higher CARs in the hearing event window support the reputation hypothesis. Alternatively, prior 
research finds low book-to-market firms and low ROA firms, and their auditors, are more likely 
to be sued (Shu 2000; Dee et al., 2011). Under the insurance hypothesis, positive BM and ROA 
could indicate these firms and their auditors are less likely to be sued, resulting in significantly 
higher CARs. Furthermore, our combined results appear to be driven by EY audit clients. 
Insert Table 7 here 
We also conduct the equation (1) regression solely for KPMG clients surrounding the 
Grand Jury investigation announcement on February 20, 2004; results are shown in Table 8. We 
find a significant negative association between CARs and audit client size (p-value < 0.05). This 
finding suggests market reaction to KPMG clients is most likely due to the insurance hypotheses, 
since auditor lawsuits are more likely for auditors of larger firms. Consistent with findings in 
Table 7, the significant positive association between CARs and BM (p-value < 0.01) suggests the 
negative CARs are due to both the reputation and insurance explanations. Furthermore, we find a 
significant positive association between leverage and CARs (p-value < 0.05). This finding is 
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counter to expectations. A negative coefficient on leverage is expected; therefore, the findings in 
Tables 7 and 8 are not conclusive for any one explanation over another.28 
Insert Table 8 here 
6.4. Seidman impact on Midsize firms analyses 
Given Seidman was in the public press for tax shelter activities during our analysis 
period, we repeat our analyses for the Midsize group (Tables 3 and 4), excluding Seidman clients 
to assess reputational spillover. Our findings and conclusions (in untabulated results) are similar, 
providing further evidence of a reputational spillover effect. 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper provides a unique summary of the U.S. tax shelter controversy, starting with 
Congressional hearings in 2003 and ending with KPMG’s announcement of a deferred settlement 
arrangement with the DOJ in 2007. Using tax shelter related events, we examine stock market 
concerns about auditor concentration, and effects on both the reputation of the accounting 
profession and the individual Big 4 CPA firms subject to investigation. We find large negative 
returns of audit clients of all providers when the KPMG grand jury investigation was announced. 
Because the returns of all audit clients were negative, we conclude the market was concerned 
competition among large audit providers would be diminished, making it difficult to find 
independent, high quality audit and non-audit providers.  
The announcement of the EY criminal inquiry indicates negative returns for clients of 
EY, Midsize, and Small audit providers. Negative returns for EY clients are consistent with a 
negative reputation effect. The negative return of Small providers is consistent with market 
                                                 
28 For both Tables 7 and 8, we use alternative auditor independence measures for FeeRatio, suggested by 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2006), including log(audit fees) and log(1 + audit fees), and  (in untabulated results) our  
findings are consistent with those reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
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concerns about audit concentration, since any threat to the large audit providers would 
potentially have the greatest impact on smaller companies.   
The market reaction of all clients is negative on the first day of Congressional hearings. 
Because only three Big 4 CPA firms testified, we conclude the hearings had a negative 
reputational impact on the entire profession, including firms not directly implicated in tax shelter 
activity. We test returns on two additional dates: the day KPMG announced reforms in its tax 
practices and the day KPMG publicly admitted criminal wrongdoing and settled with the DOJ. 
Client returns on both days are negative and consistent with the reputation hypothesis.  
Our findings are subject to certain limitations. There could be other important omitted 
variables which explain the stock price variations and their relationships to auditor reputation 
and the spillover effect around our event dates. Also, our study focuses on dates surrounding the 
release or broadcast of what we believe are the key tax shelter event dates between 2003 and 
2005. It is possible there are other important dates during this period (e.g., dates where Internet-
related rumors were spread, especially related to KPMG’s status). We focus on the dates we 
believe are key dates to test our research questions.  
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Table 1 
Event dates in the tax shelter controversy timeline and brief description of the event 
 
Event dates Brief description of the event 
June 26, 2002 PwC announces settlement with the DOJ and the IRS. 
 
July 2, 2003 EY announces settlement and fine with the IRS. 
 
November 18 and 20, 2003 Congressional hearings on C-SPAN. 
 
January 12, 2004 KPMG announces changes to high level tax personnel. 
 
February 20, 2004 Federal grand jury investigation of KPMG announced. 
 
May 25, 2004 Criminal investigation of EY tax shelter practices 
announced. 
 
May 31, 2005 Supreme Court reverses Arthur Andersen conviction. 
 
June 16, 2005 KPMG addresses Department of Justice investigation. 
 
August 29, 2005 KPMG final $456 million deferred settlement with the 
Department of Justice and IRS announced; KPMG admits 
to criminal wrongdoing. 
 
January 2007 KPMG completes payment requirements of deferred 
settlement arrangement. 
 
May 7, 2007  Some Ernst and Young tax partners indicted. 
 
May 31, 2007 
 
Financial press reports EY, as a firm, likely will not be 
charged. 
 
July 16, 2007 
 
 
May 8, 2009 
 
 
March 1, 2013 
Judge dismisses charges against 13 of the 16 KPMG 
partners charged in the tax case. 
 
Four EY partners found guilty by a jury in Manhattan on 
all counts involving the sales of fraudulent tax shelters. 
 
EY announces settlement with the Manhattan U.S. 
Attorney’s office, with $123 million in fines and penalties. 
 
 
31 
 
Table 2 
Selection of observations and descriptive statistics  
for the November 18, 2003 event date 
 
Panel A: Determination of observations. 
Audit Analytics Universe 17,518 
Less: firms with incomplete Compustat or CRSP data (11,996) 
          firms which switched auditors (1,206) 
Final sample 4,316 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the final sample. 
 
($ amounts in millions) 
 
        Mean 
 
     Median    
  Standard      
deviation 
  DT (N=744)    
       Total assets 8,772 707 44,726 
       Net sales 3,108 469 11,789 
       Income before ext. items 161 16 684 
  EY (N=1,028)    
       Total assets 5,476 552 39,600 
       Net sales 2,228 345 10,445 
       Income before ext. items 118 15 567 
  KPMG (N=806)    
       Total assets 5,281 528 51,730 
       Net sales 1,842 237 9,382 
       Income before ext. items 99 11 898 
  PwC (N=979)    
       Total assets 9,531 676 57,159 
       Net sales 3,169 412 12,424 
       Income before ext. items 233 17 1,161 
  MIDSIZE (N=320)    
       Total assets 368 114 683 
       Net sales 143 41 474 
       Income before ext. items 6 2 52 
  SMALL (N=439)    
       Total assets 309 77 775 
       Net sales 50 23 97 
       Income before ext. items 2 1 10 
 
DT is Deloitte Touche, LLP; EY is Ernst & Young, LLP; KPMG is KPMG, LLP; PwC is 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP; Midsize is the group of auditing firm including Grant Thornton, LLP; BDO 
Seidman, LLP; Crowe Chizak, LLP; McGladrey and Pullen, LLP and Plante and Moran, LLP, and Small 
consists of all other CPA firms.  Total assets and Net sales are from each sample firm’s latest audited 
financial statements prior to the event date reported in Compustat.   Income before ext. items is Income 
before extraordinary items reported on the latest audited income statement prior to the event date reported 
in Compustat. 
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Table 3 
Mean and median cumulative abnormal returns of audit clients when criminal 
investigations of large CPA firms were announced 
 
Panel A: February 20, 2004, announcement federal grand jury was paneled to 
investigate KPMG. 
Auditor 
group 
 
N 
 
Pos/Neg 
Mean 
CAR 
Median 
CAR 
Mean t-test 
Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign test  Z 
  DT 755 304:451 -0.71% -0.51% -3.833*** -3.967*** 
  EY 1,033 350:683 -1.60% -1.15% -9.007*** -8.704*** 
  KPMG 807 331:476 -1.07% -0.77% -4.535*** -3.468*** 
  PwC 1,001 404:597 -1.19% -0.72% -7.314*** -4.742*** 
  Midsize 319 121:198 -1.82% -0.88% -4.839***      -2.636 ** 
  Small 445 174:271 -1.73% -0.77% -4.882***        -2.312   * 
         
Panel B:  May 25, 2004, announcement EY was under a criminal investigation. 
Auditor 
group 
 
N 
 
Pos/Neg 
Mean 
CAR 
Median 
CAR 
Mean t-test 
Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign test Z 
  DT 769 402:367 0.20% 0.17% 3.814*** 2.827 ** 
  EY 1,056 523:533 -0.06% -0.02% 3.120***          1.516   $ 
  KPMG 816 397:419 -0.10% -0.11% 1.535    $          1.029     
  PwC 1,016 539:477 0.03% 0.20%  3.858***     3.550*** 
  Midsize 421 166:255 -0.54% -0.91%   -1.898  * -2.449 ** 
  Small 552 213:339 -0.38% -0.81%   -2.033  * -2.697 ** 
***, **, *, $  Significant at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively, using a one-tailed 
test. 
 
Pos/Neg is ratio of number of positive to negative CAR for publicly listed audit clients of the respective 
auditor group on the date indicated. 
Mean CAR is mean cumulative abnormal returns using sizeindx = own market option to determine CAR, 
matching each stock in the sample to the market and a size decile using the CRSP reported exchange and 
decile number as of the event date.  Eventus is used to calculate the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (t= 
-1 to +1) using the market model and the NYSE-only, AMEX-only, and NASDAQ-only size-decile 
portfolios as replacement market indices for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, respectively.   
Median CAR is the median cumulative abnormal returns. 
Mean t-test Patell Z is the standard Patell (1976) test assuming independent and identical distributions of 
abnormal returns. 
Generalized Sign test Z is the Cowan (1992) generalized sign test indicating whether the proportion of 
positive to negative abnormal returns around the event date is the same as in the estimation period. 
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Table 4 
Mean and median cumulative abnormal returns of audit clients of CPA firms: 
November 18, 2003, the Congressional hearing on tax shelters 
 
 
Auditor 
group 
 
N 
 
Pos/Neg 
 
Mean 
CAR 
 
Median 
CAR 
Mean t-
test 
Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign test Z 
DT 744 337/407 -0.47% -0.29% -1.660* -1.406$ 
EY 1,028 455:573 -0.54% -0.45% -1.551$ -2.240* 
KPMG 806 361:445 -0.40% -0.31% -1.349$ -1.528$ 
PwC 979 416:563 -0.51% -0.32%    -3.398***    -3.537*** 
Midsize 320 137:183 -0.98% -0.45% -1.712*     -1.007 
Small 439 169:270 -0.96% -0.60% -1.721*   -2.566** 
***, **, *, $  Significant at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively, using a one-tailed 
test. 
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Table 5 
Mean and median cumulative abnormal returns of KPMG audit clients on tax 
shelter event dates 
 
KPMG event dates 
(see Table 1 for a 
description of each 
event date) 
 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
Pos/Neg 
 
 
Mean 
CAR 
 
 
Median 
CAR 
 
 
Mean t-test 
Patell Z 
 
 
Generalized 
Sign test Z 
November 18, 2003 806 361:445 -0.40% -0.31% -1.349$ -1.528$ 
January 12, 2004 803 411:392 0.56% 0.08% 1.814* 2.278* 
February 20, 2004 807 331:476 -1.07% -0.77% -4.535*** -3.468*** 
May 31, 2005 838 390:448 0.04% -0.21% 0.683 -0.987 
June 16, 2005 840 392:448 0.21% -0.18% 0.338 -0.973 
August 29, 2005 840 381:459 -0.16% -0.27% -3.001** -1.581$ 
***, **, *, $  Significant at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively, using a one-tailed 
test. 
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Table 6 
Market reaction to publicized events of tax shelter activities on the audit market
29
 
 
              Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression model:  Rp, t  = α + βRm,t + ∑δk  Eventk,t  + εt 
Panel A: Federal Grand Jury Investigation of KPMG: 02/20/2004 
 KPMG EY PwC DT Midsize Small 
 
Variables  
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant 0.001 
(4.42)*** 
0.001 
(3.37)*** 
0.001 
(3.49)*** 
0.001 
(4.27)*** 
0.001 
(5.55)*** 
0.001 
(6.35)*** 
Rm 1.004 
(36.52)*** 
1.068 
(37.24)*** 
1.068 
(41.20)*** 
0.937 
(39.60)*** 
0.615 
(20.14)*** 
0.490 
(15.26)*** 
Event -0.004 
(-1.79)* 
-0.007 
(-2.57)** 
-0.005 
(-2.12)** 
-0.003 
(-1.54) 
-0.008 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.20)** 
Adj. R
2 0.832 0.838 0.863 0.853 0.607 0.469 
Panel B: Criminal Investigation of EY: 05/25/2004 
 KPMG EY PwC DT Mid-Tier Small-Tier 
 
Variables  
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant 0.001 
(4.19)*** 
0.001 
(3.01)*** 
0.001 
(3.20)*** 
0.001 
(4.27)*** 
0.001 
(5.22)*** 
0.002 
(6.14)*** 
Rm 1.006 
(36.26)*** 
1.070 
(36.76)*** 
1.070 
(40.80)*** 
0.937 
(39.60)*** 
0.621 
(19.96)*** 
0.495 
(15.25)*** 
Event 0.000 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.001 
(0.49) 
-0.003 
(-1.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
Adj. R
2 0.830 0.834 0.861 0.853 0.595 0.460 
Panel C: Congressional Hearing Date: 11/18/2003 
 KPMG EY PwC DT Mid-Tier Small-Tier 
 
Variables  
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant 0.001 
(6.31)*** 
0.001 
(5.86)*** 
0.001 
(5.81)*** 
0.001 
(6.46)*** 
0.002 
(9.11)*** 
0.003 
(11.15)*** 
Rm 0.765 
(33.69)*** 
0.845 
(35.46)*** 
0.841 
(39.00)*** 
0.729 
(37.44)*** 
0.387 
(16.50)*** 
0.024 
(11.45)*** 
Event -0.003 
(-1.60) 
-0.003 
(-1.61) 
-0.002 
(-1.36) 
-0.002 
(-1.66) 
-0.004 
(-2.38)** 
-0.005 
(-2.76)*** 
Adj. R
2 0.821 0.836 0.860 0.850 0.531 0.363 
***, **, *, $ Significant at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively, (two-tailed test). 
Coefficients and T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on OLS. The Coefficient δk represents the “shift in 
mean excess return” associated with the identified even (Schipper and Thompson 1983, p. 196). Event 
equals one for the (-1, +1) window surrounding the identified date and zero otherwise. Rp equals the daily 
return to an equally weighted portfolio of audit clients. Rm equals the daily market return (using the value-
weighted daily market return as a market proxy).  
                                                 
29  The estimation periods are as follows:  Panels A and B:  June 1, 2003 – June 30, 2004; Panel C:  January 
1, 2003 – December 31, 2003. 
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Table 7 
Regression of 3-day CARs on proxies for auditor reputation and insurance of audit 
clients of KPMG, EY, and PwC on November 18, 2003 
 
CARs i,t = α0 + α1(Pr_Bankrupt i,t) + α2(LnAsset i,t) + α3(BM i,t) + α4(Leveragei,t)  + α5(SaleGrowth i,t) + α6(ROA i,t) 
             + α7(InstHold i,t-1) + α8(Switcher i,t) + α9(AASwitcher i) + α10(FeeRatio i,t)  +  е i,t                                                                         
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables  N Mean 25% Median 75% 
Pr_Bankrupt 1,430 -1.792 -2.947 -1.917 -0.923 
LnAsset 1,430 6.130 4.840 6.000 7.324 
BM 1,430 0.469 0.226 0.398 0.620 
Leverage 1,430 0.466 0.268 0.453 0.625 
SaleGrowth 1,430 0.168 0.002 0.097 0.223 
ROA 1,430 0.027 -0.003 0.061 0.110 
InstHold 1,430 0.491 0.259 0.512 0.730 
Switcher 1,430 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AASwitcher 1,430 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FeeRatio 1,430 0.321 0.185 0.320 0.450 
Panel B: Cross-sectional analysis of the market reaction to Congressional Hearing 
 KPMG EY PwC Combined 
 Coef t value Coef t value Coef t value Coef t value 
Intercept -0.097 (-0.70) 0.027 (0.72) 0.013 (0.32) 0.022 (0.81) 
Pr_Bankrupt -0.017 (0.59) 0.011 (1.31) 0.005 (0.54) 0.009 (1.50) 
LnAsset -0.002 (-0.90) 0.001 (0.82) 0.000 (0.34) 0.000 (0.46) 
BM 0.010 (1.56) 0.017 (3.09)*** 0.007 (1.32) 0.011 (3.55)*** 
Leverage 0.162 (0.71) -0.067 (-1.45) -0.028 (-0.50) -0.045 (-1.26) 
SaleGrowth -0.004 (-0.59) -0.004 (-0.93) -0.006 (-1.42) -0.004 (-1.38) 
ROA -0.061 (-0.39) 0.075 (1.88)* 0.055 (1.21) 0.070 (2.37)** 
InstHold 0.012 (1.21) 0.007 (0.91) -0.004 (-0.56) 0.004 (0.76) 
Switcher 0.019 (1.41) -0.020 (-1.76)* 0.007 (0.84) 0.002 (0.37) 
AASwitcher -0.009 (-1.56) 0.001 (0.13) -0.001 (-0.21) -0.004 (-1.28) 
FeeRatio30 0.001 (0.10) -0.014 (-1.22) -0.001 (-0.06) -0.005 (-0.69) 
N 407 533 490 1,430 
Adj R-Sq 1.99% 3.57%    0.70% 2.16% 
F-statistic         1.82*   2.97*** 1.35    4.15*** 
***, **, *  Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
Pr_Bankrupt is the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress measure; LnAsset is the natural log of total assets, 
in millions; BM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets; SaleGrowth is the growth rate in sales; ROA is the return on assets; InstHold is the 
% of shares owned by institutional shareholders; Switcher is 1 if firm i switches auditors in year t or t-1, 0 
otherwise; AASwitcher is 1 if firm i switched from Arthur Andersen in years 2000-2003, and 0 otherwise; 
FeeRatio is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees. Note the number of observations in this Table 7 (N = 
1,430) is less than the total number of observations in Tables 2 and 4 for KPMG, EY, and PwC, combined 
(N = 2,813) due to missing firm observations for the variables included in the Table 7 model. 
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Table 8 
Cross-sectional analysis of the market reaction of KPMG audit clients to the 
February 20, 2004 announcement of the Federal Grand Jury investigation of KPMG  
________________________________________________________________________ 
   CARs i,t = α0 + α1(Pr_Bankrupt i,t) + α2(LnAsset i,t) + α3(BM i,t) + α4(Leveragei,t)  + α5(SaleGrowth i,t) + 
                   α6(ROA i,t) + α7(InstHold i,t-1) + α8(Switcher i,t) + α9(AASwitcher i) + α10(FeeRatio i,t)  +  е i,t 
 Coefficient t value 
Intercept -0.309 (-2.30)** 
Pr_Bankrupt -0.065 (-2.05)* 
LnAsset -0.005 (-2.09)** 
BM 0.023 (2.81)*** 
Leverage 0.429 (2.38)** 
SaleGrowth -0.003 (-0.44) 
ROA -0.263 (-1.80)* 
InstHold 0.001 (0.12) 
Switcher 0.016 (0.97) 
AASwitcher 0.005 (0.72) 
FeeRatio 0.009 (0.54) 
N 403  
Adj R-Sq 5.70%  
F-statistic 3.43***  
***, **, *  Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Note the number of observations in this Table (N = 403) is less than the number of observations in Table 5 
(N = 807) for KPMG due to missing firm observations for the variables included in the Table 8 model. 
 
 
